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Abstract
Sorkin has introduced a new, observer independent, interpretation of quantum
mechanics that can give a successful realist account of the ‘quantum micro-
world’ as well as explaining how classicality emerges at the level of observable
events for a range of systems including single time ‘Copenhagen measurements’.
This ‘co-event interpretation’ presents us with a new ontology, in which a single
‘co-event’ is real. A new ontology necessitates a review of the dynamical &
predictive mechanism of a theory, and in this paper we begin the process by
exploring means of expressing the dynamical and predictive content of histories
theories in terms of co-events.
1 Introduction
1.1 Opening Remarks
Building on the work of Dirac [6] and Feynman [11, 12], the histories approach
to quantum mechanics [20, 31, 16, 24, 38] is a reformulation and generalisation of
(Copenhagen) quantum mechanics in an observer independent framework. With a
‘space-time history’ replacing the ‘state’ as the fundamental object of the theory, the
dynamics can be rephrased as a ‘decoherence functional’ (or alternatively a ‘quan-
tum measure’) on subsets of the ‘sample space’ of histories. Observer independence
is then to be sought through the ‘embedding’ of the (Copenhagen) concept of ex-
perimentally observable events in the wider (though ill defined) notion of ‘classical
partitions’; which are typically associated with the property of decoherence (dynam-
ical classicality).
However the need for an interpretation remains. Because the mathematical for-
malism of a histories theory is reminiscent of probability theory, a naive application
of the (relatively) well understood ‘one history is real’ classical interpretation may
seem appropriate; however it fails to explain gedankenexperimentally realisable the-
ories based on the Kochen-Specker theorem [8].
The consistent histories interpretation [21, 22] is perhaps the most developed
alternative. Identifying as ‘classical’ every dynamically classical (decoherent) parti-
tion, it allows us to simultaneously assign truth valuations to all propositions within
a single consistent set (a classical partition), within the ‘context’ of that consistent
set, in a manner satisfying Boolean logic. However, two propositions that do not
participate in a common consistent set can not be simultaneously (truth) evaluated.
Sorkin has proposed a new interpretation [41, 40, 8] that can assign truth valua-
tions to all elements of the event algebra simultaneously. This is achieved by moving
1
from the classical ‘one history is real’ to an interpretation based on ‘one co-event is
real’; where a co-event is associated with a truth valuation map φ : A → Z2 obeying
certain restrictions.
A new ontology necessitates a review of the dynamical & predictive mechanism
of a theory. How do our observations and predictions relate to the objects we have
identified as (potentially) real? Can this innovation help us to develop a better
understanding of ‘classicality’, or a more complete theory of measurement? In this
paper we make a start at answering such questions by exploring means of expressing
the dynamical and predictive content of histories theories in terms of co-events.
1.2 Outline of this Paper
In section 1.3 we introduce quantum measure theory, a formulation of the histories
approach which phrases the dynamics in a fashion resembling a probability measure.
In section 1.4 we introduce the co-event interpretation, reviewing its application to
classical stochastic theories before turning to the multiplicative scheme. We are then
in a position to set out and motivate the goals of this paper in section 1.5. In section
2 we discuss the possibility of ‘moving wholesale’ from histories theories to ‘co-event
theories’, in which the dynamics is described by a probability measure on the space
of potentially real co-events. Unfortunately this approach stalls, so in section 3 we
focus our attention to experimentally falsifiable predictions, and via Cournot’s Prin-
ciple (section 3.2) attempt to explain these through approximate preclusion (section
3.3); which we apply in a manner consistent with Literal Strong Cournot (section
3.4), and then in a manner consistent with Operational Weak Cournot (section 3.5).
We conclude in section 4; appendix A reviews some results regarding the principle
classical partition.
1.3 Quantum Measure Theory
1.3.1 The Quantum Measure
Quantum measure theory [38] is a histories based attempt to approach quantum
mechanics as a generalisation of classical stochastic theories; phrasing the quantum
dynamics as a generalisation of the probability measure. We start with a brief review
of quantum measure theory and refer to [38, 39, 34, 41, 40] for more details.
A histories theory (sometimes referred to as a generalised measure theory) consists
of a triple, (Ω,A, µ), of a ‘sample space’ of histories, an event algebra and a measure.
The sample space, Ω, contains all the “fine grained histories” or “formal trajectories”
for the system e.g. for n-particle mechanics – classical or quantum – a history would
be a set of n trajectories in spacetime, and for a scalar field theory, a history would
be a field configuration on spacetime. In a classical theory Ω is the usual measure
theoretic sample space.
The event algebra, A, contains all the (unasserted) propositions that can be made
about the system. We will call elements of A events , following standard terminology
in the theory of stochastic processes. Now the power set, PΩ, of Ω is usually thought
of as a Boolean algebra under union and intersection, however for our purposes it
will be more useful to view PΩ as a ring (or an algebra over Z2), with symmetric
difference playing the role of addition (A+B := (A∪B) \ (A∩B)) and intersection
playing the role of multiplication (AB := A∩B). In cases where Ω is finite, A can be
identified with the whole power set, A = PΩ, when Ω is infinite, A can be identified
with an sub-ring of the power set, A ⊂ PΩ. In both cases, the algebraic properties of
A play a central role in the formulation of the co-event interpretation. In a classical
theory A will typically be the σ-algebra (or δ-algebra) of measurable sets.
Predictions about the system — the dynamical content of the theory — are to
be gleaned, in some way or another, from a generalized measure µ, a non-negative
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real function on A. µ is the dynamical law and initial condition rolled into one. In
a classical theory, µ will be a probability measure. In a quantum theory, µ will obey
[38, 34]:
1. Positivity
µ(A) ≥ 0, (1)
2. Sum Rule
µ(A ⊔B ⊔C) = µ(A ⊔B) + µ(B ⊔C) + µ(A ⊔C)− µ(A)− µ(B)− µ(C), (2)
3. Unitality
µ(Ω) = 1, (3)
where A, B, C ∈ A are disjoint elements of A, as indicated by the symbol ‘⊔’ for
disjoint union. Given a histories theory, we can construct the following series of
symmetric set functions,which are sometimes referred to as the Sorkin hierarchy1:
I1(X) ≡ µ(X),
I2(X,Y ) ≡ µ(X ⊔ Y )− µ(X)− µ(Y ),
I3(X,Y, Z) ≡ µ(X ⊔ Y ⊔ Z)− µ(X ⊔ Y )− µ(Y ⊔ Z)− µ(Z ⊔X)
+ µ(X) + µ(Y ) + µ(Z),
and so on, where X , Y , Z, etc. are disjoint. A histories theory is of level k (al-
ternatively it is a measure theory of level k) if the sum rule Ik+1 = 0 is satisfied.
It is known that this condition implies that all higher sum rules are automatically
satisfied, namely Ik+n = 0 for all n ≥ 1 [38].
A level 1 theory is thus one in which the measure satisfies the usual Kolmogorov
sum rules of classical probability theory, P(A⊔B) = P(A)+P(B), classical Brownian
motion being a good example. We refer to level one theories as classical theories.
A level 2 theory is one in which the Kolmogorov sum rules may be violated but
I3 is nevertheless zero. Any unitary quantum theory can be cast into the form of
a generalised measure theory and its measure satisfies the condition I3 = 0, which
trivially implies equation 2. We refer to level 2 theories, therefore, as quantum
measure theories. It is known that whenever a system can be described by standard
(Copenhagen) quantum mechanics via the usual Hilbert space construction (through
what we will call a Hilbert space theory), we can also find a quantum measure theory
describing the system. We say that the histories theory is derived from the Hilbert
space theory; the quantum measure defined using Feynman path integrals [25].
Notice that the replacement of the Kolmogorov sum rule with equation 2 has
significant consequences for the null set structure (a null set is a set of measure
zero); in particular because of (destructive) interference negligible sets (subsets of null
sets) are no longer null in general. Unfortunately we lack general results about the
structure of null sets, which is a hinderance to the development of our interpretations
of quantum measure theory. There is recent research activity in this area, for example
work on the implications of the existence of ‘antichains’ of null sets [42].
In what follows, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we shall assume all histories
theories to be level 2. Further, because of the current uncertainty as to the correct
general construction of µ and A in the case of an infinite sample space, we shall
unless specifically mentioned otherwise, assume that all sample spaces are finite and
that A = PΩ.
The existence of a quantum measure, µ, is more or less equivalent [38] to the
existence of a decoherence functional, D( · , · ), a complex function on A×A satisfying
[23, 24]:
1These are the generalised interference terms introduced in [38]
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(i) Hermiticity: D(X ,Y ) = D(Y ,X)∗ , ∀X,Y ∈ A;
(ii) Additivity: D(X ⊔ Y , Z) = D(X ,Z) +D(Y , Z) , ∀X,Y, Z ∈ A with X and Y
disjoint;
(iii) Positivity: D(X ,X) ≥ 0 , ∀X ∈ A;
(iv) Normalization: D(Ω ,Ω) = 1.2
The quantum measure is related to the decoherence functional by
µ(X) = D(X ,X) ∀X ∈ A . (4)
The quantity D(X,Y ) is interpretable as the quantum interference between two sets
of histories in the case when X and Y are disjoint.
Finally, we end this section by introducing the important concept of coarse grain-
ing [24, 25], which is crucial to the study of subsystems & emergent classicality.
Definition 1. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space. We say
that a histories theory (Λ,AΛ, µΛ) is a coarse graining of (Ω,A, µ) if:
1. Λ is a partition of Ω
2. AΛ = PΛ
3. µΛ(A) = µ(A) ∀ A ∈ AΛ
We refer to (Ω,A, µ) as a fine graining of (Λ,AΛ, µΛ). In this context we sometimes
refer to the histories γ ∈ Ω as fine grained histories to distinguish them from the
coarse grained A ∈ ΩΛ.
1.3.2 Classicality and Observation
We need to relate this framework to our (experimental) observations, and to develop
the ability to make falsifiable predictions. Now we envision that given a histories the-
ory (Ω,A, µ), some of the events in A may be ‘observable’; so that we can determine
their truth or falsity though our experience. However not all the elements of A will
in general be observable, leading us enquire into the properties the set of observable
events.
In ‘Copenhagen quantum mechanics’ described by a ‘Hilbert space theory’ we as-
sume that the ‘observables’ are given; determined by an assumed measuring appara-
tus that is external to the system. Further, we can assign (Copenhagen) probabilities
to each of these events; these probabilities constitute the predictions of the theory3.
If a histories theory (Ω,A, µ) is derived from such a Copenhagen framework, then
we inherit a set of ‘observable events’, each of which is an element of an ‘observable
partition’ (of Ω) whose elements are all observable events. Further, it can be shown
that such partitions are decoherent ; so that the decoherence functional D associated
with the measure obeys DΛ(X,Y ) = 0 whenever X,Y ∈ Λ and X 6= Y [24]. It can
be shown that this implies that the coarse grained measure µΛ obeys the axioms of
a probability measure, and that µΛ(A) is equal to the ‘Copenhagen probability’ of
the event A. These ‘probability statements’ regarding observable events form the
predictive content of such theories.
However for a general quantum measure theory we do not have a fully developed
framework for dealing with observable events. Further, one of the key themes of the
histories approach is observer independence; observations are certainly not observer
independent. This leads us to ‘embed’ the notion of (experimentally) observable
2The normalisation condition may turn out not to be necessary, but we include it because all
the quantum measures we consider in this paper will satisfy it.
3Though as we shall see a ‘probability statement’ such as P(A) = p is not in general falsifiable
through a single trial; we must construct a methodology for testing such assertions by relating them
to statements that are falsifiable.
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events into the wider (but also at present ill defined) notion of ‘classicality’; which
we require to be observer independent. Thus we wish to distinguish some partitions
as being ‘classical’ in some objective and observer independent manner; these classical
partitions are to possess the properties we require of observable partitions, and are
to be interpreted in the same manner. The idea is that the set of classical partitions
will contain the set of observable partitions; thus the ‘classical’ behaviour of observed
events is to be thought of an instance of an objective and observer independent
phenomenon.
However, as alluded to above we are as yet uncertain what this broader phe-
nomenon of classicality should be. Perhaps the simplest suggestion is that of dy-
namical classicality, or decoherence. As we saw above, ‘Copenhagen’ observable
partitions are decoherent; further, when the measure is classical the whole sample
space is decoherent. This leads us to the notion of dynamical classicality, which iden-
tifies classicality with decoherence; thus a partition Λ of Ω is dynamically classical
if and only if D(X,Y ) = 0 for all X,Y ∈ Λ such that X 6= Y . As before, it can be
shown that this implies that the coarse grained measure µΛ obeys the axioms of a
probability measure. The notion of approximate decoherence, D(X,Y ) < ǫ << 1 for
all X,Y ∈ Λ such that X 6= Y , is sometimes offered as an alternative to decoher-
ence. In particular, in the study of environmental decoherence, observed ‘emergent
classical behaviour’ is due to approximate decoherence [17, 9]. However for the pur-
poses if this paper we will focus on the ‘full’ decoherence condition. Thus, given a
general quantum measure theory, we will assume that we can identify the observable
events, that each observable event participates in an observable partition, and that
all observable partitions are dynamically classical.
Now given a single dynamically classical partition Λ, we can treat the coarse
grained histories theory (Λ,AΛ, µΛ) as a classical theory and apply our usual inter-
pretation; identifying a single history as real. We are then able to simultaneously
assign truth values (in Z2) to every element in Λ. However, when the underlying
theory (Ω,A, µ) is not itself classical, we may have various incompatible (or incom-
parable) partitions [21]; we are not able to simultaneously assign truth values to all
events in two incompatible partitions using the classical ‘one history is real’ interpre-
tation [9]. The consistent histories interpretation addresses this issue by interpreting
every ‘classical proposition’ (an event that is an element of a dynamically classical
partition) as conditional on the (‘largest’) dynamically classical partition in which it
participates. Essentially, it is only meaningful to assign truth valuations to classical
partitions, and this must be done within the context of a given dynamically classical
(or consistent) partition; two propositions can only be simultaneously answered if
they both participate in a common consistent partition [9, 21, 22].
Sorkin [41, 40] has introduced a new interpretation of quantum measure theory
that can assign truth valuations to all elements of the event algebra simultaneously,
rather than to individual consistent partitions. It is to this, co-event interpretation
that we now turn.
1.4 The Co-Event Interpretation
1.4.1 Co-Events for Classical Theories
When (Ω,A,P) is a classical theory, the ‘standard interpretation’ identifies exactly
one of the elements of Ω as the ‘real history’, γr, which ‘actually occurs’. However
the dynamics (in the form of the measure P) does not uniquely identify γr; the most
we can say with complete confidence is that the dynamics should not preclude (rule
out) the real history, which would occur were γr to be an element of a null set (a
set of measure zero). We thus use the term potential reality in referring to a history
which is not an element of a null set, and denote the set of such histories the space of
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potential realities. To avoid confusion with the potential realities, we will henceforth
refer to the real history γr as the actually real history.
Recalling that we can think of the event algebra A as the set of propositions that
can be made about the system, notice that knowledge of which potential reality is
actually real allows us to give true/false answers to each of these propositions. More
concretely, we say that an event is ‘true’ if it contains the actually real history γr,
otherwise it is ‘false’. Identifying our space of truth valuations with Z2 (where 1
is associated with ‘yes’/‘true’ and 0 with ‘no’/‘false’), we can use the history γr to
construct a truth valuation map, or co-event :
γ∗r : A → Z2,
γ∗r (A) =
{
1 γr ∈ A
0 γr 6∈ A.
(5)
We can then phrase our requirement that no potential reality should lie in a null set
in the language of truth valuation maps, so that γ ∈ Ω is a potential reality whenever
P(A) = 0⇒ γ∗(A) = 0, (6)
a condition which we will refer to as preclusion. We will refer to co-events obeying
equation 6 as preclusive.
Sorkin has suggested a subtle shift in thinking whereby the co-events γ∗ should
be regarded as real rather than the histories γ [41, 40, 8]. Thus given a classical
histories theory (Ω,A, P ) our space of potential realities is now the set of preclusive
γ∗ where γ ∈ Ω.
This shift in thinking is non-trivial because co-events have a natural algebraic
structure which we can use to generalise them from the classical case. As previously
noted, A is both a ring and an algebra over Z2 with addition identified with symmetric
difference and multiplication with intersection. As a field, Z2 is also a ring (and could
be thought of as an algebra over Z2), inheriting addition and multiplication from Z.
When the sample space is finite, it can be shown that the co-events γ∗ are precisely
the (ring) homomorphisms from A to Z2.
Lemma 1. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space. Then
{γ∗|γ ∈ Ω} = Hom(A,Z2),
where Hom(A,Z2) is the set of (ring) homomorphisms from A to Z2 excluding the
zero map.
Thus the co-events γ∗ can be characterized algebraically by the fact that they are
(non-zero) homomorphisms, which is equivalent to their adherence to the following
‘rules’:
γ∗(A+B) = γ∗(A) + γ∗(B) (linearity), (7)
γ∗(AB) = γ∗(A)γ∗(B) (multiplicativity), (8)
for all A,B ∈ A.
1.4.2 Co-Events for Quantum Theories
The co-events introduced in the previous section are tied to individual histories. We
can generalise this structure to encompass a wider class of answering map.
Definition 2. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory. Then a map
φ : A → Z2,
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is a co-event if it maps the empty set to zero. We denote the space of co-events by
A
∗. A co-event is preclusive if
µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0 ∀ A ∈ A.
It is clear that when the underlying histories theory is classical, the above defi-
nition of preclusiveness reduces to the one given in equation 6. Because of this, we
can define the ‘classical’ co-events within this more general setting, describing any
co-event (other than the zero map) as classical if it obeys linearity & multiplicativity
(equations 7 & 8). Lemma 1 means that the classical co-events are all the co-events
of the form γ∗ for some γ ∈ Ω, as described above. Given a histories theory (Ω,A, µ),
we refer to the set of preclusive classical co-events as C(Ω,A, µ).
Perhaps the most obvious means of applying co-events to quantum measure the-
ories would be to use the classical structure unaltered; thus given a histories theory
(Ω,A, µ) our space of potential realities would be C(Ω,A, µ). However it is possible
to show that classical co-events are an inadequate ontology for quantum dynam-
ics; in particular the Kochen-Specker theorem [26], often cited as an obstruction to
realism, and its proof by Asher Peres [32], can be used to construct a ‘gedanken-
experimentally realisable’ system that can not be described by any classical co-event
[8]. This leads to:
Theorem 1. There exists a ‘gedanken-experimentally realisable’ histories theory
(Ω,A, µ) with a finite sample space such that
C(Ω,A, µ) = ∅.
Proof. See [8].
The failure of classical co-events to adequately describe quantum measure theo-
ries has led to a search for alternatives. A number of co-event ‘schemes ’ have been
proposed, typically generalising from classical co-events by omitting and/or relaxing
one or both of equations 7 & 8. Many of these proposals, such as the linear [41],
quadratic and general polynomial schemes, have been conclusively ruled out [18].
Other proposals, such as the ideal and multiplicative schemes remain as viable can-
didates [40, 18]. For various reasons [37, 7, 18], the multiplicative approach has been
adopted as the current working model of co-event theory, and it is to this scheme
that we now turn.
1.4.3 The Multiplicative Scheme
Starting with a histories theory (Ω,A, µ), a co-event φ ∈ A∗ is multiplicative if it is
not the zero map and it obeys the multiplicativity condition (equation 8):
φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(B) ∀ A,B ∈ A.
An important feature of multiplicative co-events is their description in terms of filter
theory:
Lemma 2. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space, and let
φ ∈ A∗ be a multiplicative co-event. Then φ−1(1) is a principal filter.
Proof. Let A ∈ φ−1(1). If A ⊂ B then AB = A and therefore 1 = φ(A) = φ(AB) =
φ(A)φ(B) = φ(B), which means that B ∈ φ−1(1). Further, if A,B ∈ φ−1(1) then
φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(B) = 1, so A ∩B ∈ φ−1(1); thus φ−1(1) is a filter.
Now because Ω and therefore A are finite φ−1(1) must contain a minimal element
(under the partial order defined by set inclusion), which we will denote φ∗ ∈ A.
Further φ∗ must be unique, otherwise if A ∈ φ−1(1) is also minimal then A ∩ φ∗ is
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in the filter φ−1(1) and is contained in both A and φ∗, contradicting the assumption
that they are minimal. Therefore φ−1(1) is a principal filter and φ∗ its principal
element.
The association of a multiplicative co-event φ with the principal element φ∗ of
the related filter φ−1(1) can be described as a map:
∗ : A∗ → A,
∗ : φ 7→ φ∗. (9)
We can extend ∗ to an involution on A× A∗ by defining
∗ : A → A∗,
∗ : A 7→ A∗, (10)
where for all B ∈ A
A∗(B) =
{
1 if A ⊂ B
0 otherwise
(11)
It is easy to see that ∗ is bijective, and that (φ∗)∗ = φ, (A∗)∗ = A. We can therefore
think of ∗ as a duality, and will call φ∗ the dual of φ (and A∗ the dual of A).
Note that every classical co-event is also a multiplicative co-event, and that
{γ}∗ = γ∗, so our definition of the ∗ map is consistent with our previous notation.
Now the classical co-events γ∗ are dual to single histories γ, which are the potential
realities (given that they are preclusive) in classical theories. This suggests that we
might think of a multiplicative co-event A∗ as an ontological coarse graining; rather
than one history γ (or co-event γ∗) describing reality we now have a multiplicity
of histories A (or the co-event A∗), and only the properties common to all of these
histories are true.
To generalise from (preclusive) classical to (preclusive) multiplicative co-events
we have dropped the linear rule (equation 7), thus increasing the number of ‘allowed’
co-events. Unfortunately we now have ‘too many’ co-events; in particular given a
classical measure we could have non-classical multiplicative co-events, implying non-
classical behaviour of dynamically classical systems. Indeed, if the measure does not
admit null sets then the dual of every event will be preclusive and multiplicative. We
therefore need a further constraint that will restrict us to classical co-events given a
classical measure. We say that a multiplicative co-event ψ dominates a multiplicative
co-event φ if
φ(A) = 1⇒ ψ(A) = 1 ∀ A ∈ A.
A preclusive multiplicative co-event is primitive (among the set of preclusive mul-
tiplicative co-events) if it is not dominated by any other preclusive multiplicative
co-event. We can also motivate primitivity using the natural order on filters. A
preclusive multiplicative co-event φ is primitive if and only if the associated filter
φ−1(1) is maximal among the filters corresponding to preclusive multiplicative co-
events. Primitivity can be thought of as a condition of “maximal detail” or “finest
graining” consistent with preclusion. We are now in a position to fully specify the
concept of potential reality in the multiplicative scheme,
Definition 3. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space. Then
we denote the set of primitive preclusive multiplicative co-events by M(Ω,A, µ).
Comparing the multiplicative scheme with our previous results for classical theo-
ries, it is M(Ω,A, µ) which replaces C(Ω,A, µ) as the space of potential realities. In
this scheme individual histories (or equivalently classical co-events) may no longer be
potentially real, and thus can not be expected to necessarily obey the logic describing
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reality. Notice that we use ‘standard’ (Boolean) logic in our reasoning concerning
the co-events themselves.
Recall that classical co-events were discarded because we could find gedanken-
experimentally realisable histories theories that no preclusive classical co-event could
describe (theorem 1). We are therefore reassured by the following,
Lemma 3. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a history theory with a finite sample space and let A ∈ A
be non-negligible (ie A is not a subset of a null set). Then ∃φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) such
that φ(A) = 1.
Proof. Assume that ∄ φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) such that φ(A) = 1. Because A is non-
negligible we know that A∗ is preclusive. Then since A∗(A) = 1, by assumption A∗
can not be primitive, so there exists some preclusive ψ1 dominating A
∗, and by the
definition of domination ψ1(A) = 1. The same argument shows that ψ1 can not be
primitive, so there exists a preclusive ψ2 dominating ψ1 with ψ2(A) = 1. Carrying on
in this fashion we can find an infinite sequence of preclusive co-events {ψi}
∞
i=0 with
ψ0 = A
∗, with ψi dominating ψi−1 (and thus ψi−n) and with ψi(A) = 1. However
this contradicts our assumption that Ω, and therefore A and A∗, are finite; hence the
result.
Note that µ(Ω) = 1 in any histories theory, thus whenever Ω is finite we know
that M(Ω,A, µ) 6= ∅. Further, we can show that primitivity is indeed successful in
ensuring that given a classical measure our space of potential realities consists of
classical co-events.
Lemma 4. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a history theory with a finite sample space and a classical
(level 1) measure, then M(Ω,A, µ) = C(Ω,A, µ).
Proof. Let φ ∈M(Ω,A, µ). The Kolmogorov sum rule implies that the union, Z, of
null sets in A is itself null, so the preclusivity of φ implies φ∗ 6⊂ Z. Thus ∃γ ∈ φ∗ \Z
such that γ is not an element of any null set. This means γ∗ is preclusive, but then
γ ∈ φ∗ means that either γ∗ dominates φ, or that φ = γ∗. But by assumption φ is
primitive, and so is not dominated by any preclusive co-event. Therefore φ = γ∗, a
homomorphism, and φ ∈ C(Ω,A, µ). Further, any homomorphism is a multiplicative
co-event, thus M(Ω,A, µ) = C(Ω,A, µ).
Now, as touched on in section 1.3.2, the histories approach typically assumes that
dynamical classicality is an ‘emergent’ phenomena, so that classical histories theories
are to be thought of as coarse grainings of ‘deeper’ quantum measure theories. Thus
the ‘measure of the universe’ is level 2 whereas we access it through dynamically
classical partitions of the sample space on which the induced measure is level 1. We
would therefore like to see a stronger version on lemma 4 which ensured that (given
(Ω,A, µ)) all φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) ‘behave classically’ on ‘classical partitions’. Of course
whether or not we can achieve such a result depends upon how we define these two
terms, ‘classical behaviour’ turns out to be the simpler of the two:
Definition 4. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space and let
Λ be a partition of Ω. Then we say that a co-event φ ∈ A∗ is classical on Λ if the
restriction of φ to the subalgebra of A generated by Λ is a homomorphism.
As discussed in section 1.3.2, defining exactly what we mean by a ‘classical par-
tition’ remains an open area of research. On the one hand given a histories theory
(Ω,A, µ) we would like every φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) to be classical on every classical par-
tition of Ω, on the other hand we want to be able to regard classical partitions as
‘dynamically classical’ in some sense; at the very least partitions corresponding to
experimentally observable alternatives should be classed as classical. Perhaps the
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most obvious way forward would be to regard all decoherent partitions as classi-
cal, however this condition turns out to be too strong. At the very least, because
we observe and reason with Boolean logic we require our potentially real co-events
φ ∈M(Ω,A, µ) to treat classical partitions classically. We call this condition ontolog-
ical classicality or classicality with respect to M(Ω,A, µ) to distinguish it from both
dynamical classicality and the more general notion of a classical partition, which we
may require to be stronger.
Definition 5. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space. We
say that a partition Λ of Ω is classical with respect to M(Ω,A, µ) if every φ ∈
M(Ω,A, µ) is classical on Λ.
In appendix A we demonstrate the existence of a principle classical partition
ΛC which all φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) treat classically; further any partition on which any
φ ∈M(Ω,A, µ) is classical is a sub-partition of ΛC .
Relating this back to the dynamics, Sorkin has proposed a new dynamical condi-
tion, preclusive separability [37], that ensures classicality with respect toM(Ω,A, µ).
A partition Λ of Ω is preclusively separable if for any null set Z ∈ A and any partition
element A ∈ Λ, either Z ∩A = ∅ or ∃ a null set ZA ⊂ A such that ZA ⊃ A ∩ Z.
The class of preclusively separable partitions includes all partitions in which any
two histories belonging to distinct partition elements ‘end’ at different locations at the
final time (or equivalently correspond to different final time projectors in their class
operators, if the histories theory is derived from a Hilbert space theory). Thus in any
histories theories derived from a Hilbert space theory, any partition corresponding to
the alternative outcomes of a particular Copenhagen measurement (thus correspond-
ing to ‘orthogonal projectors’) obeys preclusive separability [37, 7], so the fact that
preclusively separable partitions are always classical with respect to M(Ω,A, µ) is a
powerful result. This remains an open area of research.
1.4.4 Co-Events for Coins
We illustrate the use of co-events with a simple example. Consider a single toss of
a coin; we assume that the outcome will be either ‘heads’ (‘h’) or ‘tails’ (‘t’), so our
sample space is:
Ω = {h, t},
and our event algebra
A = PΩ = {∅, {h}, {t},Ω}.
We assume no interference between the two outcomes, so that our measure is classical
µ(∅) = 0,
µ({h}) = p,
µ({t}) = 1− p,
µ(Ω) = 1.
Then assuming that p 6∈ {0, 1} we have
C(Ω,A, µ) = {h∗, t∗},
and the multiplicative co-events are:
h∗, t∗,Ω∗.
Notice that ∅∗ is not included because it is not a co-event (since no co-event maps ∅ to
unity). Now assuming that p 6∈ {0, 1} all three of the above co-events are preclusive,
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however both h∗ and t∗ dominate Ω∗, while being themselves primitive. Then we
have
M(Ω,A, µ) = C(Ω,A, µ),
as we would expect from lemma 4. Nevertheless, under non-classical measures non-
classical co-events similar to h∗t∗ are often primitive. It is thus instructive to delve
further into the non-classicality of Ω∗, which we can do by constructing its ‘truth
table’:
∅ {h} {t} Ω
Ω∗ 0 0 0 1
where each table entry is the truth valuation Ω∗(A) of the relevant event A. We can
rephrase this in ‘question & answer’ format:
Question Answer
Does the coin show heads? no
Does the coin show tails? no
Does the coin show one of heads or tails? yes
Noting that {h, t} can be thought of as a (trivial) partition of Ω, we could say that
Ω∗ is not classical on the ‘classical partition’ {h, t}. This is because Ω has non-empty
intersection with both partition elements.
1.5 The Goals of this Paper
As far as co-events go our predictive power is (so far) limited. Given an event algebra
and a measure, our co-event approach identifies the primitive preclusive co-events
(assuming a particular scheme) as the potential realities of our theory; however we
cannot in general reconstruct the measure from the set of potentially real co-events.
Were we to ignore the measure and use only the potentially real co-events themselves
(without knowledge of which co-event is actually real), we would be unable to make
any predictive statements beyond ruling out as impossible those events that are
precluded (mapped to zero) by all the potentially real co-events, and identifying as
certain all those events that are mapped to unity. This may not be quite as restrictive
as it appears, for by conditioning on known truth valuations of events (disregarding
the co-events that disagree with these valuations) we may be able to narrow down
the set of potentially real co-events to the point that such predictions are relatively
powerful [37].
However there is reason to believe (depending on the definition of classicality
we adopt) that conditioning on previous observations will not increase our power
to predict other observable events; though conditioning on non-observable events
may increase our ability to predict observable events and conditioning on observable
events may increase our ability to predict non-observable events.
In any case, it is clear that such conditioning will not in general allow us to recover
the entirety of either the measure or its predictive content, whatever definition of
classicality we adopt; whereas we would like to be able to express the full dynamical
& predictive content of a quantum measure theory in terms of the potentially real
co-events rather than the histories. We would thus be able to ‘start with’ a set of
potentially real co-events and make our predictions using only these co-events and
structures defined in terms of them. In this paper we will explore attempts to achieve
this; we are motivated in our endeavor by three arguments.
Firstly, we are treating the primitive co-events themselves as the potential realities
of the histories approach. The authors feel that we should be able to express all
meaningful statements concerning a theory in terms of the theory’s potential realities;
even if in practise it is simpler to use the measure µ defined on the event algebra,
11
at least in principle this structure should ‘emerge’ from a ‘deeper’ expression of the
dynamical & predictive content of the theory in terms of the co-events themselves.
Secondly, the presence of ‘exactly null’ sets in many gedankenexperimental frame-
works (such as the double slit experiment) depends upon idealised assumptions (such
as point slits) that do not hold in practice. Regardless of our interpretation, co-events
as they now stand cannot distinguish between events of large or small measure, so
our use of null sets to approximate ‘almost null’ sets in idealised gedankenexperi-
ments requires justification. As mentioned above, at present the range of predictive
statements we can make with the set of potentially real co-events is narrow; were we
able to fully express the predictive content of quantum measure theory in terms of
the potentially real co-events we may be able to better grapple with issues such as
‘almost null sets’ that are phrased in terms of probability rather than preclusion.
Thirdly, were we able to express in terms of co-events the predictive content of
those histories theories derived from Hilbert space theories, we might then be in a
position to extrapolate our findings and better understand the predictive content of
a general quantum measure theory (in which, for example, there may be no ‘external’
measuring apparatus).
In what follows we will explore two recent attempts to rephrase in terms of co-
events the dynamical & predictive content of quantum measure theories. We first
consider attempts to move wholesale from the ‘histories theory’ structure to one of
‘co-event theories’ in which the dynamics is defined directly in terms of co-events
(as anticipated in [40]). We then turn our attention to the important concept of
‘approximate preclusion’, and discuss the details of its implementation.
Unless specifically noted otherwise we will assume that all sample spaces are finite,
and that all histories theories are derived from Hilbert space theories (we will continue
to make the assumptions described above regarding observable events). Further, as
previously stated, given a histories theory we will assume that we can identify the
observable events, that each observable event participates in an observable partition,
and that all observable partitions are dynamically classical.
2 Dynamics on co-events
2.1 Placing a Measure on the Space of Co-Events
One approach, anticipated by Sorkin in [40], is to rephrase the dynamics (the quan-
tum measure µ) in terms of the co-events themselves; for example by placing a
measure on the space of co-events. This would be a natural development, given that
the co-events are the basic potential realities of the theory, and could lead to the
rephrasing of the entirety of quantum mechanics in terms of co-events, bypassing our
current need to construct dynamics upon the event algebra. We could then explain
the rarity of low probability events (such as ‘almost null’ sets) by using the dynamics
on our co-events to suppress (assign a low probability to) those co-events that value
them to 1.
Perhaps the most obvious way to do this would involve literally ‘moving’ the
dynamics from the event algebra onto the co-events, which can thus realise their
status as the central objects of the theory. So far we have always begun with a histo-
ries theory (Ω,A, µ) from whence we have derived our allowed co-events S(Ω,A, µ).
Since we are asserting that S(Ω,A, µ) rather than Ω is the ‘true’ sample space of
‘potential realities’ it would seem more natural to place the co-events at the center
of our structure, moving from a histories theory (Ω,A, µ) to a full co-event theory
(S, PS,PS), where S is a set of (allowed) co-events, for example S = M(Ω,A, µ),
PS is the power set of S, and PS is a probability measure on PS. We have assumed
a probability measure, for if we were to use a more general higher order measure we
would not have gained anything from our adoption of co-events in place of histories,
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encountering the same interpretational difficulties that led us to co-events. Indeed,
following that route might even lead us to adopt co-co-events, co-co-co-events and
so on. Conversely, since we are assuming that ‘one co-event is real’, the use of a
probability measure echoes the use of probability in classical stochastic theories in
which we believe that ‘one history is real’.
In a sense this approach is born of the Bayesian approach to probability [33, 5,
?], which looks on probability as representing a degree of information concerning a
system and thus ascribes meaning to individual probability statements which can
therefore be treated as ‘logical’ predicates in their own right [?]. Following this
philosophy we seek to express our incomplete information about the actual reality
in terms of probability statements concerning the potential realities, much as we
are accustomed to do in the classical theory. We can, therefore, think of PS({φ})
as the probability that the co-event φ is the actually real co-event; consequently
PS({φ}) = 0 could be interpreted to mean that φ is not a potential reality. Indeed,
we could even enforce our choice of S as the set of potential realities by extending the
domain of PS to all of A
∗, and constraining PS to be zero on all co-events outside
S.
Nevertheless our observations are in terms of events in A, so we must relate this
new structure back to our Copenhagen probabilistic predictions. As stated above we
are focusing only on histories theories (Ω,A, µ) that are derived from a Hilbert space
theory; we have assumed that in such theories we can identify the set of ‘observable
events’, that each observable event is an element of an ‘observable partition’, and that
µ is classical on all such partitions. As noted above, if A is an observable event, µ(A)
can be interpreted as a probability, and this probability agrees with the Copenhagen
predicted probability for A. Then at the very least we want, for all observable A,
µ(A) =
{
1
0
⇒ PS({φ ∈ S|φ(A) = 1}) =
{
1
0.
(12)
As we will discuss below, non-binary (ie not equal to 0 or 1) probabilities them-
selves require interpretation, and can arguably be defined in terms of repeated trials
and binary probabilities. However we will steer clear of this issue for now, and instead
of using equation 12 to define probabilities through repeated trials we will instead
use the stronger:
PS({φ ∈ S|φ(A) = 1}) = µ(A), (13)
for all observable events A. However it is not clear how ‘observable events’ should be
defined in our quantum measure theory (see section 1.3.2). We sidestep this question
by simply strengthening the condition once more to require:
PS({φ ∈ S|φ(A) = 1}) = µ(A) ∀A ∈ A. (14)
One difficulty with this condition is that in general µ(A) can exceed 1. However, even
when we are able to constrain µ to take values in [0, 1], equation 14 is a problematic
condition for multiplicative co-events, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space, let S ⊂ A∗
be a set of multiplicative co-events on A, so that
φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(B) ∀A,B ∈ A, ∀φ ∈ S.
Further, let PS be a probability measure on S such that
PS({φ ∈ S|φ(A) = 1}) = µ(A) ∀A ∈ A.
Then for any φ ∈ S, PS({φ}) = 0 unless for all A,B,C ∈ A
φ(A +B + C) = φ(A +B) + φ(B + C) + φ(C +A)
+φ(A) + φ(B) + φ(C). (15)
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As noted above, the use of a probability measure on the space of co-events echoes
its use on histories in classical stochastic theories. Then following our usual inter-
pretation that dynamically precluded ‘events’ do not occur, we conclude that the
actually real co-event must obey equation 15. Now equation 15 is the defining prop-
erty of the quadratic (co-event) scheme [18] we alluded to in section 1.4.2, a quadratic
co-event being in general a co-event obeying equation 15 though not necessarily obey-
ing linearity or indeed multiplicativity. Then since the quadratic scheme has been
ruled out [18], this puts into question our idea of ‘moving’ the dynamics onto the
co-events by constructing ‘co-event theories’ in place of histories theories, unless we
are willing to abandon the multiplicative scheme.
Of course this approach is not entirely ruled out, to arrive at equation 14 we have
made several simplifying assumptions so there may still be some scope for further
investigation. For example, if we acceptM(Ω,A, µ) as the space of potential realities
of a histories theory (Ω,A, µ), we might attempt to define all other elements of the
theory in terms of the co-events φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ). In particular, we could define events
as maps fromM(Ω,A, µ) to Z2 using the ‘dual map’ A[φ] = φ(A). Since we may not
be able to distinguish between all elements of A in this manner, we might perhaps
choose to take equivalence classes of ‘distinguishable events’ (A ∼ B if A[φ] = B[φ]
for all φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ)), and to attempt to define a measure on this set as a stepping
stone to a ‘full co-event theory’. Such a structure is yet to be explored. Alternatively,
we might explore the restrictions on µ that would enable equation 14, or we might
turn to another scheme.
2.2 Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we will prove theorem 2. We will need the following technical lemmas.
Lemma 5. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space and let φ be
a (not necessarily multiplicative) co-event. Then
φ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) = φ(A ⊔B) + φ(B ⊔ C) + φ(C ⊔A)
+φ(A) + φ(B) + φ(C), (16)
∀ disjoint A,B,C ∈ A if and only if
φ(A′ +B′ + C′) = φ(A′ +B′) + φ(B′ + C′) + φ(C′ +A′)
+φ(A′) + φ(B′) + φ(C′), (17)
∀A′, B′, C′ ∈ A.
Proof. First note that equation 16 is simply the restriction of equation 17 to disjoint
sets, so that we immediately see that equation 16 ⇐ equation 17.
To prove the converse we consider sets A1, A2, A3 ∈ A and break down their union⋃3
i=1Ai into disjoint components by defining:
A1A3A3 = A1 ∩A2 ∩A3
AiAj = (Ai ∩Aj) \ (A1A3A3)
Ai = Ai \ (AiAj ⊔AiAk ⊔A1A3A3).
(18)
Then ⋃
i
Ai = (
⊔
i
Ai) ⊔ (
⊔
i<j
AiAj) ⊔A1A3A3.
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Assuming equation 16, we can use this notation to decompose the terms in equation
17. The left hand side becomes
φ(A1 +A2 +A3) = φ((
⊔
i
Ai) ⊔A1A2A3)
=
∑
i<j
φ(Ai ⊔Aj) +
∑
i
φ(Ai ⊔A1A2A3).
Similarly turning our attention to the right hand side, for i, j, k distinct we find that
φ(Ai +Aj) = φ(Ai ⊔AiAk ⊔Aj ⊔AjAk)
= φ(Ai ⊔Aj) + φ(Ai ⊔AiAk) + φ(Ai ⊔AjAk)
+φ(Aj ⊔AiAk) + φ(Aj ⊔AjAk) + φ(AiAk ⊔AjAk),
and
φ(Ai) = φ(Ai ⊔AiAj ⊔AiAk ⊔A1A3A3)
= φ(Ai ⊔AiAj) + φ(Ai ⊔AiAk) + φ(Ai ⊔A1A3A3)
+φ(AiAj ⊔AiAk) + φ(AiAj ⊔A1A3A3) + φ(AiAk ⊔A1A3A3).
Comparing these it is easy to see that that the left and right hand sides of equation
17 are equal, hence the result.
We now introduce some notation. First, given a histories theory (Ω,A, µ) and a
co-event φ ∈ A∗ we define
QABC(φ) = φ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) + φ(A ⊔B) + φ(B ⊔ C) + φ(C ⊔A)
+φ(A) + φ(B) + φ(C), (19)
where A,B,C ∈ A are disjoint events. Then lemma 5 tells us that φ ∈ A∗ is quadratic
if and only if QABC(φ) = 0 for all disjoint A,B,C ∈ A.
Now though co-events take values in Z2, probability measures take values in R.
It will be useful to algebraically combine the images of (the values returned by) co-
events and probability measures, which we can achieve by thinking of Z2 as a subset
of R; thus given a co-event φ ∈ A∗ we can construct the related map:
φ˜ : A → R
φ˜(A) =
{
0 φ(A) = 0
1 φ(A) = 1.
Using this map we can define a real valued analogue of the function QABC :
RABC : A
∗ → R
RABC(φ) = φ˜(A ⊔B ⊔ C)− φ˜(A ⊔B)− φ˜(B ⊔ C)− φ˜(C ⊔A)
+φ˜(A) + φ˜(B) + φ˜(C)),
where A,B,C ∈ A are disjoint events. We can show that if φ obeys the multiplicative
rule then RABC is either 0 or 1, regardless of our choice of A,B,C.
Lemma 6. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space, and let
φ ∈ A∗ be multiplicative. Then for all disjoint A1, A2, A3 ∈ A we have:
RA1A2A3(φ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Since φ is multiplicative, for any A ∈ A we know that φ(A) = 1 if and only if
φ∗ ⊂ A. Then fixing our three events A1, A2, A3 we have four cases:
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1. φ∗ 6⊂ A1 ⊔ A2 ⊔ A3; then φ(A1 ⊔ A2 ⊔ A3) = φ(Ai ⊔ Aj) = φ(Ak) = 0 for all
i, j, k, so that RA1A2A3(φ) = 0.
2. φ∗ ⊂ A1 ⊔ A2 ⊔ A3, φ∗ 6⊂ Ai ⊔ Aj for any i, j; then φ(A1 ⊔ A2 ⊔ A3) = 1 but
φ(Ai ⊔Aj) = φ(Ak) = 0 for all i, j, k, so that RA1A2A3(φ) = 1.
3. φ∗ ⊂ Ai ⊔Aj for some i, j, but φ∗ 6⊂ Ak for any k. Without loss of generality
we can assume that i, j = 1, 2; then φ(A1 ⊔A2 ⊔A3) = 1, φ(A1 ⊔A2) = 1, and
φ(Ak) = 0 for all k. Further, φ
∗ 6∈ A2 ⊔ A3 otherwise φ∗ ∈ A2, similarly φ∗ 6∈
A3 ⊔A1, so φ(A2 ⊔A3) = φ(A3 ⊔A1) = 0. Therefore RA1A2A3(φ) = 1− 1 = 0.
4. φ∗ ⊂ Ai for some i; without loss of generality assume that i = 1. Then
φ∗ 6⊂ A2, A3, since these sets are disjoint to A1. Then φ(Ak) = δ1k, φ(A1 ⊔
A2) = φ(A1 ⊔A3) = 1, φ(A2 ⊔A3) = 0, and finally φ(A1 ⊔A2 ⊔A3) = 1. Thus
RA1A2A3(φ) = 1− 1− 1 + 1 = 0.
Hence the result.
Finally, we can relate RABC and QABC .
Lemma 7. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space and let
φ ∈ A∗ be a multiplicative co-event. Then if A,B,C ∈ A are disjoint
RABC(φ) = 0⇒ QABC(φ) = 0.
Proof. First, denote by X Mod 2 the Z2 element corresponding to the integer
X mod 2, where X is an integer in R. Then φ(A) = φ˜(A) Mod 2 for any A ∈ A, so
noting that + and − are equivalent in Z2, for any disjoint A,B,C ∈ A we have:
RABC(φ) Mod 2 = φ˜(A ⊔B ⊔ C) Mod 2
−φ˜(A ⊔B) Mod 2− φ˜(B ⊔ C) Mod 2− φ˜(C ⊔A) Mod 2
+φ˜(A) Mod 2 + φ˜(B) Mod 2 + φ˜(C) Mod 2,
= φ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) + φ(A ⊔B) + φ(B ⊔ C) + φ(C ⊔A)
+φ(A) + φ(B) + φ(C),
= QABC(φ).
Hence the result.
We are now in a position to prove the theorem.
Proof. of theorem 2
By assumption our probability measure PS obeys equation 14, then the sum rule
obeyed by the quantum measure (equation 2) gives us:
PS({φ|φ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) = 1}) = PS({φ|φ(A ⊔B) = 1}) +PS({φ|φ(B ⊔C) = 1})
+PS({φ|φ(C ⊔A) = 1})−PS({φ|φ(A) = 1})
−PS({φ|φ(B) = 1})−PS({φ|φ(C) = 1}), (20)
for all disjoint A,B,C ∈ A. Now because PS is a probability measure we can use
the Kolmogorov sum rule to decompose its valuation on any set into a sum of its
valuations on the elements of that set. Thus if we define pφ = PS({φ}) we get:
PS({φ|φ(A) = 1}) =
∑
φ(A)=1
pφ
=
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(A), (21)
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for all A ∈ A. Putting this back into equation 20 we get:
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(A ⊔B ⊔C) =
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(A ⊔B) +
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(B ⊔C) +
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(C ⊔A)
−
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(A)−
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(B)−
∑
φ∈S
pφφ˜(C), (22)
for all disjoint A,B,C ∈ A, which we can rewrite as:
0 =
∑
φ∈S
pφRABC(φ) ∀ disjoint A,B,C ∈ A. (23)
Now fix A,B,C and let ZABC ⊂ S be the set of co-events φ such that RABC = 0.
Further denote by ZABC the set of co-events such that RABC 6= 0, so that S =
ZABC ⊔ ZABC . Now by assumption every φ ∈ S is multiplicative, so by lemma 6
φ ∈ ZABC ⇒ RABC(φ) = 1. Then equation 23 gives us:
0 =
∑
φ∈ZABC
pφRABC(φ) +
∑
φ∈ZABC
pφRABC(φ),
=
∑
φ∈ZABC
pφ. (24)
Noting that pφ ≥ 0, this means pφ = 0 for all φ ∈ ZABC . Since A,B,C are arbitrary
disjoint sets, we conclude that pφ = 0 unless RABC(φ) = 0 for all disjoint A,B,C.
But by lemma 7 RABC(φ) = 0 implies that QABC(φ) = 0, which by lemma 5 implies
that φ is quadratic. This completes our proof.
3 Approximate Preclusion
Rather than tackling the whole of the dynamics, an alternate approach is to focus
directly on the predictive content of a histories theory. Thus instead of, or as a
step towards, expressing µ in terms of the theory’s allowed co-events, we would
primarily be concerned with the probability statements that are the (experimentally
falsifiable) predictions of our theory. As before, we seek to be able to ‘start’ with a
set of potentially real co-events, and to make our experimental predictions in terms
of these co-events and structures defined in terms of them.
Our strategy will be to examine more closely the meaning (or interpretation) of
probability as applied to (experimentally) falsifiable predictions; thus we look to un-
derstand a dynamical statement µ(A) = q or P(B) = p through its (experimentally)
falsifiable implications. We will begin by focusing on classical theories, where we can
draw from a long history of thought upon the matter to pick a suitable interpretation
of probability; we then seek to generalise this interpretation in terms of the poten-
tially real co-events in such a manner that can be extended to quantum histories
theories.
This strategy requires a somewhat rigorous approach to the interpretation of prob-
ability, for we are not simply attempting to justify pre-existing statistical practice,
but to construct a predictive framework for a new ontology. In a world of co-events,
what do we mean by µ(A) = q, or even P(A) = p? Since co-events have been con-
nected to the measure through the preclusion of null sets, a natural approach is to
seek an interpretation of probability based on this notion. We begin with a simple
example that will guide us through this process.
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3.1 The Classical Coin
Consider a coin described by classical stochastic dynamics. We assume that if we
throw the coin we will either have a ‘heads’ or a ‘tails’ result, we will further assume
that all such throws are in some sense ‘equivalent’ so that the probability of ‘heads’
is always p and the probability of ‘tails’ always 1− p. But what exactly do we mean
by this?
One approach to its interpretation is to emphasise the role of probability in rep-
resenting our knowledge or expectations about a system, so in this case we would
for example say that p = 1/2 if we had no information or view on the outcome of a
coin toss [33, 5, ?]. An alternate approach focuses on the practical testing of such
assertions, which takes place through a set of repeated, independent trials [14, 28].
In the latter framework a probability assertion P(heads) = 1/2 is a statement, not
about a single trial, but about a theoretical ensemble of trials, or a prediction regard-
ing a hypothesised set of future trials. Although the former approach is valid and
useful, for example in the theory of decision making [1], in light of our difficulties in
constructing a probability measure on the space of co-events (section 2) we will focus
on the latter approach, which is more in accordance with the predictive and exper-
imental nature of our field, and as we shall see lends itself naturally to the concept
of preclusion. We begin by discussing how we might test an assertion P(heads) = p
in practice.
We test a theory, or a statement within a theory, by testing its experimentally
falsifiable predictions. But when we believe there is one realised outcome (the actually
real co-event, or the real history if we using the naive interpretation) we face the
problem that unless p ∈ {0, 1}, the statement P(heads) = p can not be falsified by
either outcome ‘heads’ or ‘tails’. We can however make falsifiable statements about
sequences of trials.
The frequentist approach, as articulated by Friedman [14], interprets a probability
statement P(heads) = p by identifying it with the asymptotic relative frequency of
the outcome ‘heads’ in an infinite sequence of repeated trials; under the requirement
that the sequence of trials conforms to a ‘randomness’ criterion [14, 44]. Indeed, if
we had a theoretical ensemble of infinitely many trials, the proportion of the trials
resulting in heads would be exactly4 p; alternatively the assertion that ‘the proportion
of heads is not p’ is precluded by the measure on the ensemble, and herein lies our
link with co-events.
However asymptotic properties of a sequence cannot be determined using a finite
number of elements of the sequence, and an infinite ensemble of trials is not realis-
able in terms of an experiment, whereas we seek to phrase probability in terms of
experimentally falsifiable predictions. Further, the co-event is meant to be ‘real’, so
it is not meaningful to say it precludes an imagined event in a theoretical ensemble
that is not part of the ‘actual’ event algebra on which the co-event is defined.
We are thus pushed into defining probabilities based upon finite trials, and will
focus on one particular technique of testing probability assertions through a sequence
of repeated trials; the standard statistical technique of hypothesis testing [43]. We
present a simple version of hypothesis testing that will suffice for the purposes of this
paper.
We begin with our assertion, or hypothesis, P(heads) = p and repeat our trial n
times, resulting in a history γ consisting of n ordered ‘heads’ or ‘tails’ outcomes (we
will ignore the issue of the ‘randomness’ of this sequence for now). We will denote
by H (or H(γ)) the number of these trials that result in a ‘heads’ outcome, so that
the proportion of heads is H/n; to compare this ‘statistic’ [43] with the implications
of our hypothesis we assume the product measure (which we shall also denote by P)
on the sequence of trials. Using NH to denote the event that the number of heads
4More precisely it would be p with probability 1.
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in the realised history is H , we define the cumulative probability of NH to be:
CP(NH) =
H∑
m=1
P(Nm). (25)
Thus CP(Nk) is the probability that the number of heads in the realised history is
less than or equal to k. For the purposes of this paper we will say that we reject the
hypothesis at the ǫ level if CP(NH(γ)) < ǫ, where 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 (typically ǫ << 1). If γ is
such that CP(NH(γ)) ≥ ǫ we fail to reject the hypothesis at the ǫ level
5. Note crucially
that we have implicitly chosen to organise the potential outcomes according to the
number (or equivalently the proportion) of heads outcomes, based on our hypothesis;
the importance of this choice will become clear below.
This technique (or a more sophisticated version thereof [43]) can be used in the
testing of scientific theories; ǫ is then chosen to represent the ‘degree of certainty’ we
wish to test our theory to. However, assuming p 6∈ {0, 1} no history (no sequence of
outcomes) is actually precluded by our hypothesis; strictly speaking the hypothesis
has no falsifiable implications for the realised outcomes, thus no realised history can
falsify the hypothesis.
To justify our hypothesis testing technique, and to place it on a more rigorous
footing, we turn to Cournot’s Principle [4, 35]; which has long been used to connect
“the mathematical formalism of probability to the empirical world” [15].
3.2 Cournot’s Principle
Crudely speaking, in one way or another Cournot’s Principle ‘rules out’ events of
small probability. This concept was certainly known to Bernoulli, who asserted that
high probability can be treated as a ‘moral certainty’ [2]. Cournot himself made
the connection with physics, arguing that events of small probability may be math-
ematically possible but ‘physically impossible’ [4]. Among many other references,
the principle is used or alluded to by Levy [29, 30], Markov [35], Borel [3] & Kol-
mogorov [28, 27], under the name ‘Principle B’. More recently it has been applied
by Goldstein et al to statistical mechanics [19] and Bohmian mechanics [10], and by
Galvan to quantum mechanics [15]. For a more detailed discussion of the history of
Cournot’s principle see [35].
However it was the French mathematician Maurice Frechet who coined the term
“principe de Cournot”, which has come into English as ‘Cournot’s Principle’, or the
‘Cournot Principle’ [35]. Frechet distinguished between Strong and Weak forms of
Cournot’s Principle [13]; Shafer describes these two formulations as follows [35]:
The strong form refers to an event of small or zero probability that we
single out in advance of a single trial: it says the event will not happen on
that trial. The weak form says that an event with very small probability
will happen very rarely in repeated trials. Some authors, including Levy,
Borel, and Kolmogorov, adopted the strong principle. Others, including
Chuprov and Frechet himself, preferred the weak principle.
Kolmogorov’s statement of Strong Cournot (his ‘Principle B) as concerns the proba-
bility P(E) of an event E occurring in an experiment C is [28, 27] (as translated by
Sahfer & Vovk [36]):
If P(E) is very small, one can be practically certain that when C is carried
out only once, the event E will not occur at all.
5This is essentially a ‘one-tailed test’; while both one- and two-tailed tests would be equally valid
in this context (though they would correspond to different values of ǫ), we will find the one-tailed
test simpler to analyse.
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These statements contain some ambiguities, for example, in Kolmogorov’s ‘Principle
B’, what exactly do we mean by ‘practically certain’? To apply Cournot’s Principle
to co-events, we will have to be more rigorous. We begin by giving a more precise
specification of the Strong Cournot Principle:
Literal Strong Cournot Events of probability less than ǫ << 1 do not occur, for
some ǫ > 0.
Where there is no danger of confusion with other variations of the Strong Cournot
Principle, we will refer to Literal Strong Cournot simply as the ‘Strong Cournot
Principle’, or ‘Strong Cournot’. This literal specification of the Strong Cournot
Principle is in some ways a ‘maximal’ interpretation of the Cournot Principle, and
as such may appear to be ‘neat’ or ‘simple’; it would also allow us to deal with
probability ‘objectively’, and in the absence of observation, by grounding it in the
ontology. However it is problematic in the case of classical stochastic theories. Firstly
what do we mean by a small probability, are we to take ǫ as a constant of nature?
Secondly there is nothing to prevent the probability of every single history in the
repeated trial being much smaller than the probability of the events we wish to
preclude, in which case a literal application of Strong Cournot would rule out all
single histories, and thus any reality. In fact an example of such a situation is
provided by our coin, given a sufficiently large number of trials.
Since Literal Strong Cournot is not appropriate for classical theories, we instead
present a ‘minimal’ version of Weak Cournot that allows us to perform the hypothesis
testing described above, but little else.
Operational Weak Cournot In a repeated trial, an event of probability less than
ǫ << 1, identified ahead of the repeated trial, will not occur, for some ǫ > 0.
Only a single event can be considered for a given repeated trial.
Thus we can only make one prediction for each repeated trial. Where there is no
danger of confusion with other variations of the Weak Cournot Principle, we will
refer to Operational Weak Cournot simply as the ‘Weak Cournot Principle’, or ‘Weak
Cournot’. Notice that our reference to repeated trials is essentially semantic; a single
trial can be considered as a special, ‘n = 1’, case of a repeated trial, and a general ‘n
times’ repeated trial can be considered as a single trial in which sequences of length n
are thought of as single outcomes. We insist on the term ‘repeated trial’ to emphasise
the link between Operational Weak Cournot and hypothesis testing6.
Operational Weak Cournot has the advantage that it fits in well with our actual
methods of falsifying theories, such as the statistical hypothesis testing discussed
in section 3.1. When we make the hypothesis P(heads) = p, there may be certain
outcomes that would convince us that this hypothesis has been falsified; for example
we may reconsider the assertion P(heads) = 1/2 were we to toss our coin a million
times only to find a heads outcome for every toss. We can turn this around by saying
that those outcomes that would falsify a theory are precluded by it. Of course there
remains some ambiguity in the choice of ǫ, however this ambiguity is inherent and has
not been introduced by our adoption of Weak Cournot; whatever interpretation of
probability we adopt we would have to choose the ǫ we use to falsify our theories (of
course this ǫ need not be unique). In a sense this identification takes the arbitrariness
of our choice of ǫ out of our theory and into the ‘meta’ level on which we compare
and reject theories. The ‘meta’ level is always present and by using it to give us ǫ
we have avoided the addition of ‘new’ ambiguity.
6Indeed, we regard Operational Weak Cournot as a variation on Shafer’s ‘weak principle’ precisely
because of the shared emphasis on repeated trials. We note however, that in its insistence that
certain ‘low probability’ events will not occur (rather than occurring rarely, Operational Weak
Cournot bears some resemblance to Shafer’s strong principle’.
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Applying this to our coin (section 3.1), we start with our hypothesis P(heads) =
p, then in the context of a ‘possible’ experiment (or n-fold repeated trial) we choose
to consider the proportion of heads that would be realised in such as experiment,
and thus single out the event7 L that the realised history γ will obey CP(H(γ)) < ǫ.
Since the probability of this event is less than ǫ, using Operational Weak Cournot
we are justified in asserting that it will not occur (we are assuming the hypothesis).
The non-occurrence of L then becomes a falsifiable prediction of our hypothesis; and
once we perform the experiment, the occurrence of the event L would falsify the
hypothesis.
However, given the realised history γ (once the experiment has been carried out),
if n is sufficiently large we will always be able to find an event that has occurred (ie
it contains the realised history) yet is assigned probability < ǫ by the hypothesis;
for example, as mentioned above the event that the realised history γ will occur
will itself be of probability < ǫ for sufficiently large n. Because of this, to rule out
the problems faced by Literal Strong Cournot we have phrased Operational Weak
Cournot so as to allow conclusions to be drawn concerning only the single8 falsifiable
prediction (implied by our hypothesis) singled out before the experiment and being
tested by it.
In this way Operational Weak Cournot provides us with a practical method of
relating probability statements to experimental measurements, though we have had
to adopt a ‘minimalist’ and perhaps ‘restrictive’ interpretation of probability, which
might for example restrict our ability to treat probability statements as logical pred-
icates [?]. However in the classical theory this has no impact on either our ontology
or the ‘meaning’ we attribute to dynamics, for we typically assume a deeper deter-
ministic theory operating at a more fundamental level. This will not hold in the
quantum case, which therefore will require us to take our chosen interpretation of
probability more seriously.
3.3 Approximate Co-Events
In one way or another Cournot’s principle rules out events of small probability.
Because this is a straightforward generalisation of the concept of preclusion, which
rules out null sets, we can easily express it in terms of co-events by introducing the
concept of approximate preclusion. For the sake of clarity we will henceforth refer to
preclusion itself as exact preclusion, thus an exactly preclusive co-event (which we
will sometimes shorten to an exact co-event) obeys
µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0
whilst an approximately preclusive co-event is given by:
Definition 6. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory. Given ǫ > 0 a co-event φǫ is
approximately preclusive at the ǫ level if
µ(A) < ǫ⇒ φǫ(A) = 0.
We say that φǫ is an approximately preclusive co-event, or simply an approx-
imate co-event.
Notice that this definition holds for a general histories theory, not simply in the
classical case, and thus might be used to generalise Cournot’s Principle.
7This is an event in the event algebra related to the sample space of all possible sequences of
outcomes in our repeated trial.
8Each such prediction is an element of the event algebra related to the sample space of all possible
sequences of outcomes in our repeated trial. thus if we wish to make multiple predictions in the
context of a single experiment, we can combine them using the logical (Boolean) operations in the
event algebra to yield a single event.
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Though the introduction of approximate co-events is a fundamental change in
the the theory, its implications for the ‘internal structure’ of the ‘allowed’ co-events
is less than radical. To be precise, we have effectively altered the precluded events,
including ‘almost null’ as well as null sets. We will refer to events of measure less
then ǫ as ‘approximately precluded’ or ‘ǫ-null’ sets, with ‘ǫ-negligible’ sets defined
similarly. However other than this we have made no changes, and have not altered
the algebraic structure of the co-events, and so can define many of the same concepts
and prove many of the same theorems that we could for exactly preclusive co-events.
In particular we can define multiplicativity, domination and primitivity based upon
approximate preclusion in exactly the same way we defined these concepts for exact
preclusion, leading to a notion of ‘approximate co-event schemes’ and in particular an
approximate multiplicative scheme, which we shall henceforth assume. Further, we
can prove ‘approximate co-event versions’ of many of the results we have established
for the exact multiplicative scheme, for example the following lemma, which shall
make use of below, is analogous to lemma 3:
Lemma 8. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a history theory with a finite sample space and let A ∈ A
be non-negligible (ie A is not a subset of a null set). Then there exists a primitive
approximately preclusive multiplicative co-event φǫ such that φǫ(A) = 1.
Proof. See proof of lemma 3.
In a classical theory, how we interpret φǫ depends on the version of Cournot’s
Principle we are following. Weak Cournot means that the φǫ are essentially theoret-
ical tools, used to phrase (experimentally falsifiable) predictions in terms of preclu-
sion. In this case ǫ will be taken from our ‘meta’ level choice of ǫ used to falsify a
given theory, and may not be the same for every system. On the other hand Strong
Cournot means that the φǫ are the potential realities, in which case we may consider
ǫ as a constant of nature. Note that our basic ontology remains unchanged, the
‘actually real’ co-event remains our description of reality and its internal structure
(or logic) is still given by the multiplicative rule9. What we have done is to alter the
set of potential realities given a measure, thus essentially we have altered the role &
meaning of the measure.
Moving from classical stochastic theories to quantum mechanics and the multi-
plicative scheme, we are no longer treating a single history as real10 so our objections
to Strong Cournot may no longer be relevant. This leads us to question whether it
may be possible to achieve Strong Cournot in the context of quantum measure theory,
and to take the φǫ literally. One advantage of such an approach lies in our practise
of treating some events of small probability as null. In section 1.5 we raised concerns
regarding the preclusion of ‘approximately null’ sets, arguing that true null sets are
rare; in fact due to experimental inaccuracies the events we are characterising as null
will in general be only of small probability. Approximate preclusion is tailor made to
address such concerns, in particular if we are able to adopt Strong Cournot we can
preclude such sets directly.
If Strong Cournot, as expressed by approximate co-event, is to be applicable to
a general quantum measure theory, it must certainly make sense in the context of
classical theories. In the next section we therefore use approximate preclusion to
explore the application of Strong Cournot to hypothesis testing in a classical theory;
returning to the example of our simple coin (section 3.1). In what follows we assume
that all co-events are multiplicative.
9We assume that the multiplicative scheme holds for all histories theories, in a classical theory
it ‘happens’ to coincide with the classical scheme.
10More precisely we are no longer expecting our primitive multiplicative co-events to be classical
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3.4 Can we Achieve Strong Cournot?
3.4.1 Approximate Preclusion for a Coin
As before we assume that if we throw the coin we will either have a ‘heads’ (‘h’) or
a ‘tails’ (‘t’) result, we will further assume that all such throws are in some sense
‘equivalent’ so that the probability of ‘heads’ is always p and the probability of tails
always 1 − p. Thus in the histories formalism, a single throw corresponds to the
sample space:
Ω = {h, t}. (26)
In the language of our hypothesis testing technique (section 3.1), our hypothesis is
that P({h}) = p, so that the classical measure P is:
P({h}) = p,
P({t}) = 1− p,
P({h, t}) = 1. (27)
An ‘experiment’ consisting of n trials (which we assume to be independent) has the
sample space
Ω = {h, t}n, (28)
of histories (ordered sequences of outcomes) γ = a1, . . . , an, where ai ∈ {h, t}. The
corresponding event algebra is PΩ and since we have assumed that our trials are
independent we use the product measure, which by abuse of notation we shall also
denote by P.
Now we have previously denoted the number of ‘heads’ outcomes in a history γ
by H(γ), so that the proportion of ‘heads’ is H(γ)/n. Then we have:
P({γ}) = pH(γ)(1 − p)n−H(γ). (29)
We are less interested in the individual histories than in the proportion of heads,
which, as discussed above, should reflect the underlying probability p of a heads
outcome in a single trial. We will denote by NH the event that the number of heads
realised in the sequence is H . Then we have:
P(NH) =
(
n
H
)
pH(1 − p)n−H . (30)
Further, we will label by LH and GH the events that the number of heads in the
realised sequence is less than or equal to or greater than H respectively. Then we
get:
P(LH) =
∑
m≤H
P(m),
= CP(NH). (31)
Thus if we performed such an experiment and realised a proportion of heads corre-
sponding to a small P(LH) < ǫ we would reject our hypothesis P(h) = p (at the ǫ
level). Turning this around, given the assumption P(h) = p we wish to preclude all
events LH (and NH) with P(LH) < ǫ for some small ǫ.
We can make this more precise; since the measure P is classical and non-zero
everywhere, and since Lm is a proper subset of Lm+1, we can see that P(Lm) is
monotonic in m. Thus defining Hǫ as the greatest H such that P(LH) < ǫ, we have
P(LHǫ+m) ≥ ǫ ∀ m > 0; in particular P(LHǫ) < ǫ ≤ P(LHǫ+1). Thus, following the
argument of section 3.1 we would like to say that LHǫ is precluded while LHǫ+1 is
not. Since P(LH) > 0 in all cases, we turn to approximate preclusion.
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Adopting Strong Cournot, we fix ǫ and assume that events of measure less than
ǫ never occur. Then we can immediately rule out LHǫ , indeed φǫ(LHǫ) = 0 for all
approximately preclusive co-events φǫ. However, this does not hold for LHǫ+1, indeed
since P(LHǫ+1) > ǫ by lemma 8 there exists a primitive approximate co-event φHǫ
mapping it to unity. In other words:
φHǫ(LHǫ) = 0,
φHǫ(LHǫ+1) = 1. (32)
Thus every potential reality precludes LHǫ , but not every potential reality precludes
LHǫ+1. This is enough to allow us to use the hypothesis testing technique outlined
in section 3.1, thus enabling us to deal with (experimentally falsifiable) predictions
in terms of our approximate co-events. Since approximate preclusion is defined in
terms of a general histories theory, this seems to raise the possibility of a predictive
approximate co-event framework for a general quantum measure theory. However,
though widening the scope of preclusion by moving from exact to approximate co-
events has introduced useful features to our theory, we must make sure that it has
not also introduced problems.
3.4.2 The Failure of Strong Cournot
The above construction seems promising, it seems that our shift from exact to ap-
proximate preclusion has succeeded in introducing new & useful features to co-event
theory; however we must check that it has not inadvertently introduced new problems
as well. In dealing with exactly preclusive co-events we can show that (under cer-
tain conditions) classical measures always imply classical outcomes meaning that the
co-events will necessarily behave classically (see section 1.4.3); do the approximate
co-events always ‘behave’? Such concerns lead to three objections to the construction
we outlined above:
I The Status of Single Histories
The first question to be raised regards the status of single histories. In a system
obeying non-classical dynamics we may be happy with single histories not being
realised, however in this system with its classical dynamics we could still find
all single histories to be ruled out for a sufficiently large number of trials. This
raises interpretational issues, for example if we take p = 1/2, ǫ = 10−3 and
n = 10 we find all single histories ruled out. However if n = 9 all single
histories are allowed. We have several problems here, firstly we may not be
comfortable with the non-classical behaviour of the n = 10 system. Secondly
there is the question of the value of ǫ, which leads to classical outcomes in the
n = 9 case but not the n = 10 case. Finally it seems odd that one additional
trial will ‘disallow’ classical behaviour, particularly given that a single trial
behaves classically in and of itself.
Note that we don’t have a causality problem here; although in the n = 10
system no single history is realised this will not become apparent in the first
trial. The two outcomes of the first trial can be thought of as a coarse grained
partition of the n = 10 sample space, and as such each outcome has probability
greater than ǫ. This will also hold in general, any single history in the n =
10−m system (where 1 ≤ m ≤ 9) corresponds to a coarse grained event in the
n = 10 system that has probability greater than ǫ and so is not precluded.
Further note that this problem of systems that behave classically becoming
non-classical in a repeated trial can occur in the histories framework without
the use of co-events. We could take the view that no system is truly classical,
but rather that at the level of observable events we have an emergent classicality
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based on environmental decoherence. Adopting this view, observed ‘classical’
behaviour is due to approximate decoherence [37, 7], and repeated trials of an
approximately decohering system (such as a ‘quantum coin’ with interference
ε between heads and tails) may lead to non-classical outcomes, notably the
reappearance of quantum coherence [37].
II The Problems of Assigning Ontology to the Approximate Co-Events
The second question to be raised concerns the range of possible co-events ‘al-
lowed’ by approximate preclusion. We may be able to construct allowed co-
events φǫ such that some observable questions have no definite answer. In other
words our framework allows potential realities that if realised would imply ob-
servable anhomomorphisms.
For example, {LHǫ , GHǫ} is a partition of Ω, both elements of which are ob-
servable (since all events are observable in this classical system). Then using
lemma 8 there will be at least one primitive approximate co-event φGǫ mapping
GHǫ to 1, and φGǫ will map LHǫ to 0 (as do all approximate co-events) because
P(LHǫ) < ǫ. However, although we can ‘cherry-pick’ the co-event φGǫ to treat
the partition {GHǫ , LHǫ} classically, we do not know if φHǫ will map Gǫ to
one and so treat this partition classically. More generally we do not have any
guarantee that all the allowed co-events will treat this partition classically; in
fact we can find primitive approximate co-events that map both elements of
the observable partition {GHǫ , LHǫ} to zero.
We can find subsets of histories T ⊂ LHǫ and P ⊂ GHǫ such that P(T ),P(P ) <
ǫ but P(T ⊔ P ) > ǫ. Now P(T ⊔ P ) > ǫ means that by lemma 8 some subset
C of T ⊔ P will be the dual of a primitive approximate co-event C∗. Further
both T and P are approximately precluded so C cannot be a subset of either;
therefore C has non-empty intersection with both LHǫ and GHǫ , which means:
C∗(LHǫ) = 0
C∗(GHǫ) = 0. (33)
For an explicit example consider the case p = 1/2, n = 103 and ǫ = 10−3; then
Hǫ = 450 since P(L450) < ǫ whereas P(L451) ≥ ǫ. Now L451 = L450 ⊔N451, so
there is some (not necessarily unique) subset S ⊆ N451 such that P(S⊔L450) ≥
ǫ whereas P((S\{γ})⊔L450) < ǫ for any γ ∈ S. We can think of constructing S
by adding fine grained histories from N451 to L450 one by one until the measure
is greater than ǫ; thus we can not reduce the set S ⊔ L450 without its measure
falling below ǫ. In fact, because p = 1/2 (and the measure is classical) every
single history γ contributes the same amount, pn = 2−10
3
, to the probability
of any event containing γ, so that P(S) = pn|S|. Further, since the measure is
classical we know that ǫ ≤ P(S) +P(L450) < ǫ+ pn. Therefore:
p−n(ǫ−P(L450)) ≤ |S| < p
−n(ǫ−P(L450)) + 1, (34)
so that S could be any subset of N451 of cardinality:
|S| = Int(
ǫ−P(L450)
pn
)
≈ 1.4× 10297, (35)
where Int(x) denotes the least integer which is greater than or equal to x.
Then the set S ⊔ L450 has measure greater than or equal to ǫ, and so is not
a subset of any ǫ-null set (since the measure is classical). Further, we cannot
reduce our set without the remainder being ǫ-negligible. Therefore S ⊔ L450 is
the base of an approximate co-event (S ⊔L450)∗ that maps both GHǫ and LHǫ
to zero.
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III The Inconsistency of Multiple Partitions
Finally, in the examples we have looked at so far, we considered a single par-
tition Ω = GHǫ ⊔ LHǫ which was treated non-classically by some allowed co-
events. Intuitively, both elements of this partition correspond to ‘meaningful’
propositions; that the proportion of heads in the observed history is less than
or equal to (LHǫ), or greater than (GHǫ), Hǫ/n. However, we did not attach
any particular ‘meaning’ to our ‘problem co-event’ C∗, indeed as a proposition
the related event C is ‘pathological’ in that it would be difficult to express it as
an ‘English sentence’ as we were able to do for LHǫ and GHǫ above. This might
lead one to speculate that we could perhaps focus on partitions and co-events
corresponding to ‘good’, ‘meaningful’ or ‘useful’ propositions, whilst ignoring
partitions and co-events corresponding to ‘bad’ or ‘pathological’ propositions;
indeed we were able to find the ‘good’ approximate co-event φGǫ that was
classical on the ‘good’ partition Ω = GHǫ ⊔ LHǫ .
However the situation is not so simple; in the above we focused on a single par-
tition, whereas there are many ‘good’ partitions, each with its associated ‘good’
co-events. Unfortunately the co-events that treat one partition classically will
not in general be classical on another partition, as the following example shows.
When the number of trials of our coin is even, n = 2m, we can partition
the sample space Ω into even and odd coarse grainings as follows. Given a
single history γ = a1, a2, . . . , a2m (where ai ∈ {h, t}) we can form the even
and odd histories E(γ) = a2, a4, a6, . . . , a2m and O(γ) = a1, a3, a5, . . . , a2m−1.
Likewise we can form the even and odd coarse grainings ΩE = {E(γ)|γ ∈ Ω}
and ΩO = {O(γ)|γ ∈ Ω}, which inherit their associated measures from Ω, and
it is easy to see that Ω = ΩE ⊔ΩO. Building on this, we can treat both ΩE and
ΩO in the same way that we previously treated Ω by looking at the number of
heads in the even and odd trials, HE and HO respectively. Given an ǫ we can
go on to define HEǫ , H
O
ǫ , and the subsets GHEǫ , GHOǫ and LHEǫ , LHOǫ of the two
distributions. Then, following the analysis above, we can define the co-events
φE
GE
ǫ
, φO
GO
ǫ
corresponding to the questions ‘is the number of heads in the even
distribution greater than or equal to HEǫ ?’ and ‘is the number of heads in the
odd distribution greater than or equal to HOǫ ?’. Now as before we have
φEGE
ǫ
(LHE
ǫ
) = 0
φEGE
ǫ
(GHE
ǫ
) = 1, (36)
however now we also have
φEGE
ǫ
(LHO
ǫ
) = 0
φEGE
ǫ
(GHO
ǫ
) = 0, (37)
with φO
GO
ǫ
showing similar behaviour.
For an explicit example consider the case p = 1/2, m = 103 and ǫ = 10−3; thus
the even and odd distributions are similar to the example considered above.
Then HEǫ = H
O
ǫ = 450, and as before every single history γ contributes the
same amount, p2m = 2−2∗10
3
, to the probability of any event containing γ; thus
the measure of any event S is given by P(S) = p2m|S|. From this we can see
that an event S is a subset of an approximately precluded set T if and only if S
itself is approximately precluded, thus an approximate co-event φǫ is preclusive
if and only if its dual φ∗ǫ has measure greater than or equal to ǫ; then if φǫ is
preclusive
ǫ ≤ P(φ∗ǫ ) = p
2m|φ∗ǫ |,
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so that
|φ∗ǫ | ≥ ǫp
−2m = 10−3 × 22×10
3
.
Thus φǫ is primitive if and only if |φ∗ǫ | = Int(ǫp
−2m), where Int(x) denotes the
least integer that is greater than or equal to x. Now let γE = a1, a2, . . . , a2m
be the history defined by the outcomes
ai =
{
h i even
t i odd.
Then E(γE) = hhhh . . . and O(γE) = tttt . . ., so γE ∈ LHO
ǫ
∩ GHE
ǫ
. Now it is
easy to see that P(GHE
ǫ
) > ǫ, so that |GHE
ǫ
| > ǫp−2m and thus we can find an
event C ⊂ GHE
ǫ
of cardinality Int(ǫp−2m) that contains the history γE . But
then setting φE
GE
ǫ
= C∗, we have found a primitive approximately preclusive
co-event satisfying equations 36 & 37. A similar construction can be made for
φO
GO
ǫ
.
This is in fact a coarse graining problem (as are most of the problems in the
multiplicative scheme) reminiscent of the interpretational problems of the con-
sistent histories approach. Essentially we can recover the probabilities in the
measure (or decoherence functional) but we are also recovering the interpre-
tational problems in the sense that different coarse grained partitions have
become incompatible. In consistent histories each question ‘makes sense’ in
one decoherent partition, but may not have a classical answer in other deco-
herent partitions. In our case every approximate co-event (which corresponds
in a natural way to a question via its dual) will treat at least one partition
classically (for example the partition consisting of its dual and the complement
thereof) but may not treat other partitions classically, even though these parti-
tions are dynamically classical (in that they decohere). However this feature is
more of an issue for approximate preclusion than for consistent histories, since,
as our coin example shows, approximate preclusion may have difficulties even
when the underlying fine grained histories obey classical dynamics, a problem
not shared with consistent histories.
We can gain further insight into these problems by applying the machinery of the
‘principle classical partition’ introduced in appendix A. Essentially, even though the
measure is classical we are finding non-classical behaviour at the level of the approx-
imate co-events. This might suggest that our observable partitions are finer grained
that the principle classical partition, and indeed while we are assured that when
using exact preclusion an classical measure will lead to a fully fine grained principle
classical partition (every non-null singleton set is an element of the partition), we do
not have such a guarantee when using approximate preclusion.
It is instructive, therefore, to calculate the principle classical partition for our
repeated trial; to provide an explicit example we set p = 1/2, n = 103 and ǫ = 10−3
as before. Then every history γ ∈ Ω is of equal probability P({γ}) = 2−10
3
, and
the Kolmogorov sum rule means that every set S ⊂ Ω of trials has a probability
determined solely by its cardinality, P(S) = 2−10
3
|S|. Then if we set m = Int(210
3
ǫ)
(where Int(x) denotes the least integer which is greater than or equal to x), we
see that P(S) ≥ ǫ for every set of cardinality greater than or equal to m and that
P(S) < ǫ for every set of cardinality less than m. Thus if Sm is of cardinality m, it
is not itself approximately precluded, however every subset of Sm is approximately
precluded. Thus S∗m is a primitive approximately preclusive co-event. Since m > 2,
given any two trials γ1, γ2 ∈ Ω we can find a primitive approximately preclusive
co-event φǫ = S
∗
m whose dual contains both trials, γ1, γ2 ∈ Sm. In other words, if we
fix γ1, given any γ2 ∈ Ω we can find a primitive φγ2ǫ whose dual contains both γ1 and
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γ2. But then the transitive closure of the duals of all these primitive approximate
co-events is the whole sample space Ω, and the principle classical partition is simply
{Ω}.
As a final comment on Strong Cournot, we note that the value of ǫ used in this sec-
tion may be considered ‘large’, in that we can find experimentally observable events
with smaller probability. Following this line of thought we might attempt to evade
the above objections to Strong Cournot by interpreting the results outlined above
as placing a ‘cap’ on the level of ǫ (which in Strong Cournot we are taking to be a
constant of nature). Thus we would conclude that the value of ǫ must be small com-
pared to the probabilities of observable events (including experimentally achievable
repeated trials)11. There are however objections to this argument. Firstly, such an
approach would be unlikely to address the questions surrounding the status of single
histories; in particular, with regard to an anticipated theory of quantum gravity, the
individual ‘histories of the universe’ may not have ‘large’ measure. Secondly, and
more seriously, it is our use of ǫ ro preclude observable events which allows us to dis-
cuss probability in the language of co-events, the very reason we turned to Cournot’s
Principle. Decreasing the value of ǫ decreases our ability to falsify probability hy-
potheses, so a value of ǫ so small as to avoid the problems outlined above would not
give approximate preclusion any significant advantage over exact preclusion in the
discussion of dynamics. Thus even if we adopted Strong Cournot with such a small
ǫ, we would in any case be driven to some other mechanism (such as Weak Cournot)
to deal with dynamics & prediction. For these reasons, the authors prefer to discard
Strong Cournot in favour of Weak Cournot.
3.5 Quantum Operational Weak Cournot
Although Strong Cournot may be more philosophically satisfying, in particular with
regard to co-event theory, the arguments of section 3.4 above conclusively demon-
strate the failure of its application to multiplicative co-events due to violations of
observable classicality. As in classical stochastic theories, this leads us to fall back
on Weak Cournot. Though perhaps less philosophically satisfying than the strong
variety, it may be the ‘best we can do’, at least at the present time.
Our application of Operational Weak Cournot to quantum histories theories is
similar in some ways to its classical application (section 3.2). We again evoke the
‘meta-level’ process by which we falsify theories to give us ǫ, which consequently
is no longer considered as a constant of nature and may be different for different
systems. Our restriction of approximate preclusion to events singled out ahead of
a repeated trial avoids the problems of multiple partitions and single histories en-
countered above. Essentially, we depart from Strong Cournot by introducing a split
between the ontology and the predictive content of the theory; whereas in Strong
Cournot both are described by a primitive approximate co-event we now propose:
Ontology: The potential realities are primitive exactly preclusive (multiplicative)
co-events. In the example of the classical coin above, since the measure is classical,
these primitive co-events correspond to single fine grained histories.
Predictions: In an experiment consisting of repeated trials, an experimentally ob-
servable event A singled out in advance, of measure less than ǫ, will not occur. We
can of course phrase this in terms of approximate co-events, replacing the phrase ‘of
measure less than ǫ’ by ‘precluded by all approximate co-events φǫ’. However this is
tautological, and the use of approximate co-events is now rather vacuous since the
ontology is given by primitive exactly preclusive co-events.
11Repeated trials in which n is not so large that the repeated trial is experimentally unrealisable
in practise
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This formalism aims to allow us to use the hypothesis testing technique described
in section 3.1 to test ‘Copenhagen predictions’ (discussed in section 1.5) through ex-
periments consisting of repeated trials, for both classical and non-classical systems.
There are, however, several objections we can make.
Firstly, the restriction of our predictive ability to such experiments may obstruct
the application of Weak Cournot beyond the Copenhagen framework, and the need
to single out our predictions in advance of an experiment raises questions regarding
observer independence; a hallmark of the histories approach. Thus even if Weak
Cournot is successful in justifying the Copenhagen predictive mechanism from the
perspective of quantum measure theory it is doubtful that it will assist us to develop
a wider conception of the predictive content of a general quantum measure theory
as hoped for in section 1.5. Simply by choosing to focus solely on (experimentally
falsifiable) predictions we have constructed a formalism in which we cannot attach
any (‘physical’) meaning to non-predictive dynamical statements. While such an
‘instrumentalist’ view of dynamics may be appealing to some [7], the authors feel
that the dynamics should express something about the structure of reality, even in
the absence of observation.
Had Literal Strong Cournot been applicable it would have avoided such issues,
since Cournot’s Principle would have been applied at the ontological level and thus
its implications would have been observer independent. More importantly this split
between the ontology and the predictive mechanism separates us not only from Strong
Cournot but also from the application of Weak Cournot in classical physics. In
a classical theory we typically assume an underlying deterministic dynamics; the
dynamical statements of this ‘true theory’ would then have observer independent
meaning, allowing probability to be considered as an instrumentalist phenomena
without any implication for the interpretation of this ‘true dynamics’.
Further, in a classical stochastic theory our statement of Weak Cournot is made
in terms of the event algebra and the measure, which are both defined in terms of
the histories; the potential realities of the theory. In quantum measure theory our
potential realities are primitive exactly preclusive multiplicative co-events, however
our formulation of Weak Cournot is still expressed in terms of events and the measure
defined on them, or alternatively in terms of approximate co-events. Thus contrary
to the goals we set out in section 1.5 we have not been able to express the predictive
content of quantum measure theory in terms of its potential realities.
Finally, by adopting the above formulation of Weak Cournot we have not made
headway in our attempt to deal with ‘almost null’ sets (section 1.5). Given our
practice of treating ‘almost null’ sets as ‘exactly null’ by assuming idealised conditions
our inability to address this issue is a cause for concern.
4 Conclusion
Our aim in this paper has been to rephrase the dynamical & predictive content of a
quantum histories theory in terms of (multiplicative) co-events, or at the very least to
demonstrate that this is possible in principle even if in practice it may be simpler to
work with event algebras. In particular, we were concerned that due to experimental
inaccuracies the events that we are characterising as null will in general be only of
small probability.
Our first, and potentially most appealing proposal was to shift the dynamics
wholesale onto the co-events, ‘completing’ the co-event program by moving from
‘histories theories’ to ‘co-event theories’ in which we could use co-events and the
dynamics defined on them to deal directly with physical systems. This would have
allowed us to deal with events of small probability by assigning small probabilities
to the co-events that found those events to be true. Unfortunately this approach has
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stalled.
Our second proposal was approximate preclusion. Following Strong Cournot we
aimed to explain the emergence of probability from preclusion by altering the status
of the measure with regard to the allowed co-events. This would have allowed us
to deal with events of small probability by directly precluding them. Again, this
approach has not met with success.
Finally we have been driven to adopt Weak Cournot, which can perhaps be used
to justify the (existing) Copenhagen experimental framework from the vantage point
of a quantum histories theory. However we do not manage to express our predictions
in terms of the ‘potentially real’ co-events themselves, and make no headway in
extending our understanding of a histories theory’s predictive content beyond the
narrow Copenhagen framework. Further, we are left in a quandary regarding the
application of preclusion in practice. As we have previously pointed out the events
that we are assuming to be null, for example in the double slit experiment, are only
found to have zero measure following the assumption of an idealised system that we
know cannot hold in practice. Thus for our results to have application to the real
world an alternate solution to this problem must be found.
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A The Principle Classical Partition
For the purposes of this appendix, where there is no scope for confusion we will
sometimes abbreviate ‘classical with respect to M(Ω,A, µ)’ to ‘classical’. We can
extend the notion of fine graining to a partial order on the partitions of Ω. We say
that a partition Λ of Ω is a fine graining of, or equivalently is less than, a partition
Θ of Ω if Θ can be regarded as a partition of Λ. Equivalently we could say that Θ
is a coarse graining, or is greater than, the partition Λ. It is easy to see that fine
graining induces a partial order on the space of partitions of Ω.
Restricting to classical partitions, we can show that this partial order contains
a unique minimal element, the ‘finest grained’ classical partition, which we call the
principle classical partition (with respect to M(Ω,A, µ)).
Theorem 3. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space. Then
there exists a classical partition (with respect to µ) Λ of Ω that is minimal among
the classical partitions of Ω. Furthermore Λ is unique.
To prove this we first need a technical lemma:
Lemma 9. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space. Then the
partition Λ of Ω is classical with respect to µ if and only if for every φ ∈M(Ω,A, µ)
there exists Ai ∈ Λ such that φ∗ ⊂ Ai.
Proof. First assume that Λ = {Ai}ni=1 is a classical partition of Ω. Then by as-
sumption φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) will behave classically on Λ, which means it will act as
a homomorphism; obeying linearity (equation 7) and multiplicativity (equation 8)
when restricted to the subalgebra generated by Λ. Then:
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1. Assume that φ(Ai) = 0 ∀i; linearity then implies that φ(Ω) = 0. Then multi-
plicativity implies that φ is the zero map, which is excluded from M(Ω,A, µ),
contradicting our assumptions.
2. Assume φ maps more than one element of Λ to one; without loss of generality
φ(A1) = φ(A2) = 1. Noting that the Ai are disjoint (as elements of a partition),
multiplicativity implies φ(∅) = φ(A1A2) = φ(A1)φ(A2) = 1, contradicting our
assumption that φ is a co-event.
Therefore there exists j such that φ(Ai) = δij . But then φ
∗ ⊂ Aj .
To prove the converse, note that because the Ai are disjoint every element of the
subalgebra generated by Λ is of the form BI =
⊔
i∈I Ai for some indexing set I. Now
let φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ), then by assumption there exists Ak ∈ Λ such that φ∗ ⊂ Ak.
Then for all BI in the subalgebra generated by Λ we have:
φ(BI) =
{
1 k ∈ I
0 k 6∈ I.
Thus it is easy to see that φ is a homomorphism on the subalgebra generated by
Λ.
We are now in a position to prove the theorem.
Proof. of theorem 3
Existence: The partition {Ω} is always classical.
Minimality: Because Ω is finite the set of partitions thereof, and in particular the
set of classical partitions thereof, is also finite. It is easy to see that the ‘fine
graining of partitions’ defines a partial order in the set of classical partitions of
Ω, which must therefore contain a minimal element Λ.
Uniqueness: We enumerate the primitive preclusive multiplicative co-events by set-
ting M(Ω,A, µ) = {φi}mi=1 where m = |M(Ω,A, µ)|. Now let ΛA = {Ai}
nA
i=1
and ΛB = {Bi}
nB
i=1 be distinct partitions that are both minimal among the
set of partitions of Ω that are classical with respect to M(Ω,A, µ). Then for
every φi ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) lemma 9 gives us Aji ∈ ΛA and Bki ∈ ΛB such that
φ∗i ⊂ Aji and φ
∗
i ⊂ Bki . But then φ
∗
i ⊂ Aji ∩Bki for all i, so the by lemma 9
the partition ΛAB = {Aj ∩Bk} is classical and is finer than both ΛA and ΛB,
contradicting our assumption. Therefore ΛA = ΛB, and the principle classical
partition is unique.
In what remains of this appendix we will enumerate the primitive preclusive
multiplicative, M(Ω,A, µ) = {φi}mi=1, where m = |M(Ω,A, µ)|. If none of the duals
of the co-events ‘overlap’, so that φ∗i ∩φ
∗
j = ∅ for i 6= j, then it is easy to see (lemma
10 below) that the principle classical partition is given by :
{φ∗i |φ ∈M(Ω,A, µ)} ⊔ {{γ}|γ 6∈ φ
∗ for any φ ∈M(Ω,A, µ)}.
However the duals of co-events in M(Ω,A, µ) will in general overlap, leading to a
generalisation of the above. If Λ is a classical partition we already know (lemma
9) that given φi ∈ M(Ω,A, µ) we can find Ami ∈ Λ such that φ
∗
i ⊂ Ami . Now
assume that φ∗i ∩ φ
∗
j 6= ∅ for some i 6= j, then φ
∗
j ∩ Ami 6= ∅, so using lemma 9
φ∗j is also a subset of Ami . Repeating this argument, if we can find a φ
∗
k that has
non-empty intersection with φ∗j , then φ
∗
k ⊂ Ami even if φ
∗
k ∩ φ
∗
i = ∅. Thus we really
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want to ‘group together’ the φ∗i that are related by some sort of transitive closure of
intersection; we achieve this by use of an equivalence relation.
First we define a relation, ∼∩, on the setM∗(Ω,A, µ) := {φ∗|φ ∈ M(Ω,A, µ)} as
follows:
φ∗i ∼∩ φ
∗
j ⇔ φ
∗
i ∩ φ
∗
j 6= ∅.
This relation is reflexive and symmetric, thus its transitive closure, ≈∩, is an equiva-
lence relation, which we will call intersection equivalence. We can therefore partition
M∗(Ω,A, µ) using ≈∩ to give us the set M
∗
∩(Ω,A, µ), and will denote by Φ
∗(φ∗i )
the equivalence class containing φ∗i . Finally, we can ‘merge’ the elements of the
equivalence class Φ∗(φ∗i ) to give us the set:
ΦF∗i :=
⋃
φ∗∈Φ∗
φ∗. (38)
It is easy to see that ΦF∗i ∈ A (since is it the union of elements of A), so its dual
ΦFi := Φ
F∗∗
i is a co-event. This leads us to define:
M∗F (Ω,A, µ) := {Φ
F∗
i |Φ
∗ ∈M∗∩(Ω,A, µ)},
MF (Ω,A, µ) := {Φ
F
i |Φ
∗ ∈M∗∩(Ω,A, µ)}. (39)
The ΦF∗i (or their duals) are sometimes referred to as fat co-events. The fat co-event
corresponding to φ∗i is denoted by Φ
F∗(φ∗i ). It is clear that the Φ
F∗
i are disjoint,
however they do not necessarily form a cover of Ω. Thus if we define Z to be the set
of singleton sets of histories that are not an element of any ΦF∗i (or equivalently any
φ∗i ) we can form the partition:
ΛC =M
∗
F (Ω,A, µ) ⊔ Z, (40)
of Ω. It is easy to see that ΛC is the principle classical partition with respect to µ.
Lemma 10. Let (Ω,A, µ) be a histories theory with a finite sample space. Then ΛC
as defined above is the principle classical partition with respect to µ.
Proof. Every φ ∈M(Ω,A, µ) is an element of an equivalence class Φ∗(φ) ∈ M∗∩(Ω,A, µ),
and thus is a subset of the fat co-event ΦF∗(φ) ∈ ΛC . Then by lemma 9 ΛC is a
classical partition with respect to µ.
Now let Λ = {Ai} be a classical partition (with respect to µ). In the above we
showed that if φ∗i ⊂ Am then φ
∗
j ⊂ Am whenever φ
∗
i ∩φ
∗
j 6= ∅. Then using an inductive
argument it is easy to see that φ∗k ⊂ Am whenever φ
∗
k ≈∩ φ
∗
i , so that Φ
F∗(φ∗i ) ⊂ Am.
Further, for any element {γ} of Z we can find a Am such that {γ} ⊂ Am, thus Λ can
be considered a partition of ΛC . But since Λ was arbitrary, ΛC is less than or equal
to every classical partition; and so must be the principle classical partition.
The principle classical partition helps us to further develop the notion of classi-
cality for the multiplicative scheme, and more generally the histories approach. Note
the contrast with the idea of classicality in consistent histories (see for example [21]),
in which the absence in general of a ‘principle decoherent partition’ allows the pos-
sibility of incompatible but ‘equally valid’ classical interpretations (or ‘frameworks’
[21]) of a given system.
Further, note that there is no way to distinguish between two intersectionally
equivalent co-events using the classical partitions. Thus if we make the assumption
that ‘observable events’ are elements of classical partitions, this suggests that no
sequence of measurements could allow us to distinguish between the distinct realities
described by two co-events within the same intersectional equivalence class. In this
way the fat co-events may be a useful practical rule, representing the ‘finest grained’
information we could possibly discover using experimental techniques; a state of
affairs we might think of as conforming to a co-event uncertainty principle.
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